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THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSES OF THE CIVIL
WAR AMENDMENTS: A REPOSITORY OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER
R ciAPD J. ORLoSKI*
The thirteenth amendment abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude. The fourteenth amendment provided that no state shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States and that no state shall deny any person life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor deny any person the equal protection
of the laws. The fifteenth amendment ensured that the right to vote
shall not be abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude. Historically, these amendments have been viewed as self-
executing and have been given force and effect without further legisla-
tion.1 However, in addition to the self-executing portion of the
amendments, there was added to each an enforcement clause which
provided Congress with the power to enforce the amendment by ap-
propriate legislation.2
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT CLAUSES
Throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
centuries, the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments had
little impact on constitutional law. This can be explained, in part, by
the curious interpretation given the enforcement clauses by the Su-
preme Court. In United States v. Cruikshank,8 the defendants were
charged with conspiring to prevent citizens of African descent from
exercising their right of franchise and the rights and privileges secured
to them by the United States Constitution and laws thereunder. The
conduct charged was made an indictable criminal offense by section
six of the Enforcement Act.- The defendants were convicted at trial,
and on appeal, the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana was
divided and certified the question to the United States Supreme
Court. In reversing the convictions, the Court commented on the
enforcement provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments:
* B.A., Kings College, 1968; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1971.
1 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883); Butler v. Perry, 67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150, aff'd, 240 U.S. 528 (1914).
2 US. CONSr. amend. XMI, § 2; amend. XIV, § 5; amend. XV, § 2.
8 92 US. 542 (1876).
4Act of May 81, 1870, ch. 114 § 6, 16 Stat. 141.
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The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
but this provision does not ... add anything to the rights which
one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The
equality of rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.
Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its
citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power.
That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still re-
mains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States
is to see that the States do not deny the right. This the amend-
ment guarantees, but no more. The power of the national gov-
ernment is limted to the enforcement of this guaranty.
... From [the fifteenth amendment] it appears that the right
of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship; but
that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right
on account of race, etc., is. The right to vote in the States comes
from the States; but the right of exemption from the prohibited
discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not
been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States;
but the last has been.5
Consequently, according to the logic of Chief Justice Waite's opinion,
the enforcement clauses merely gave Congress the permission to guar-
antee rights which owed their existence to the authority of state gov-
ernments. As Chief Justice Fuller succinctly stated several years later,
"The Fourteenth Amendment ... did not invest ... Congress with
power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state
legislation."6
This interpretation contemplated a twofold approach by which
the courts would look to state law to determine what rights, if any,
were involved, and then only secondarily to Congress as the guarantor
of such state rights. In practical effect, therefore, this surety-type role
which was defined for Congress gave it little, if any, authority under
which it could pass remedial legislation except in those instances where
a state followed a contradictory policy of giving rights with one hand
and taking them away with the other. This type of situation, of course,
was doomed to be a rarity for it was much easier never to give than to
give and simultaneously take away.
In the last half of the twentieth century, with its impetus for
social reform, the enforcement clauses of the Civil War amendments
gained a new constitutional prominence. In three landmark cases,
5 92 U.S. at 554-55, 555-56 (emphasis added).
6 Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1891).
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach,7 Katzenbach v. Morgan,s and Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co. 9 the Supreme Court appeared to offer definitive
answers concerning the scope of Congress' power under the three
clauses.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,0 the Court held that the provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act of 196511 pertaining to the suspension
of state eligibility tests12 and to the usage of federal voting examiners
and federal standards for registration of state voters3 were appropriate
means for carrying out Congress' constitutional responsibilities under
the fifteenth amendment to ensure the right of franchise for blacks.
In reaching this result, Chief Justice Warren noted that section two
of the fifteenth amendment gave Congress the power to legislate in
order to effectuate the constitutional guarantee of the right to vote
embodied in the first section of that amendment:
[Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment expressly declares that
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation." By adding this authorization, the Framers indicated
that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the
rights created in § 1. "It is the power of Congress which has been
enlarged... "14
This holding was unanimous inasmuch as Justice Black concurred in
the majority's view of the scope of congressional power under the
fifteenth amendment while dissenting, in part, on other grounds.15
Chief Justice Warren also enunciated the test to be used in
deciding whether or not the enforcement legislation actually falls
within the permissible legislative purposes of the amendment. Borrow-
ing from McCulloch v. Maryland,6 the Court held:
The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express
powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the
States. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic formulation,
50 years before the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
7 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
8 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
9 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
10 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
1142 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970).
12 Id. § 1973b.
13 Id. § 1973d.
14 383 U.S. at 325-26, quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
15 See 383 U.S. at 355 (Black, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but con-
sistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."17
Consequently, South Carolina v. Katzenbach unanimously held
that the enforcement clause of the fifteenth amendment gave Congress
the separate and distinct power to legislate for the purpose of pro-
tecting and promoting voting by blacks, and that use of the apparatus
of the federal government under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a
legitimate and rational means of implementing that end.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 8
held that the same Act was a proper exercise of the powers granted to
Congress by the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment
and was properly applied to prohibit the enforcement of New York
election laws which required the ability to read and write English as
a condition for voting. In reaching this result, Justice Brennan ob-
served for the majority that it was not necessary for the Court to agree
that the state activity which was restricted by federal statute must be in
itself a violation of the equal protection clause:
A construction of § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment] that would
require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state
law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condi-
tion of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate
both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility
for implementing the Amendment. It would confine the legislative
power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only
those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge
unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the
judiciary by particularizing the "majestic generalities" of § I of
the Amendment.1 9
Justice Brennan also restated the McCulloch v. Maryland formulation
as the proper test for determining the legitimate scope of congressional
power under section five of the fourteenth amendment and concluded
by arguing that the enforcement clause gave Congress the power to
decide what legislation was necessary to guarantee all persons the equal
protection of the law:
Correctly viewed, § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment] is a positive
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
17 383 U.S. at 326-27, quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819).
18 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1Old. at 648-49 (footnotes omitted).
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discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2o
In anticipation of Justice Harlan's dissent,21 Justice Brennan noted in
a footnote that section five of the fourteenth amendment gave Con-
gress no power to dilute the protection afforded by the amendment. 2
The majority holding of Katzenbach v. Morgan, in conjunction
with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, appeared to set clear guidelines
regarding the scope of congressional power under the enforcement
clauses. So long as it was rationally related to enforcing the policies
of the amendments, federal legislation was constitutionally "appro-
priate" even though it had no premise in the enumerated powers of
Congress under article I, section eight of the Constitution.23 Congress
could not, however, use the enforcement clauses to enact by statute
that which was prohibited by amendment. In ultimate effect, the
Supreme Court was giving federal legislation under the enforcement
clauses the same presumption of validity that it gives all legislative
enactments while at the same time explicitly noting that it would not
allow the use of this presumption to effect the repeal of the amend-
ments' guarantees by statutory enactments.
Finally, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,24 the Court resurrected
the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment to hold that a
dormant, one-hundred-year-old statute which provided for equality
of the races with respect to inheriting, purchasing, leasing, selling,
holding, and conveying real and personal property was a constitution-
ally valid attempt to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.
Blacks were therefore entitled to seek declaratory and injunctive
relief under this statute against private citizens who refused to sell
personal or real property to blacks solely on the grounds of race. In
commenting on the scope of congressional power thus recognized, the
majority opinion by Justice Stewart held that under the thirteenth
amendment Congress had the power to determine the badges of slavery
"'and the authority to translate that determination into effective legis-
20 Id. at 651.
21 See id. at 659, 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan feared that this discre-
tion over the scope of the amendment's enforcement legislation was tantamount to giving
Congress the power to dilute the amendment's protection.
22 Id. at 651 n.10. See note 56 infra.
23 For an excellent comparison between the McCulloch v. Maryland standard on
"necessary and proper" legislation and the "appropriate legislation" standard of the
enforcement clauses, see Judge Wisdom's opinion in United States v. Louisiana, 225
F. Supp. 353, 360-61 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 880 U.S. 145 (1965).
24 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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lation."25 Congress was vested with the theoretical and actual power
not only to eliminate slavery but also the badges and incidents thereof,
and in so legislating for this purpose, to pass laws governing the action
of state governments and private conduct as well:
As its text reveals, the Thirteenth Amendment "is not a mere
prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an
absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not
exist in any part of the United States." It has never been doubted,
therefore, "that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article
by appropriate legislation," includes the power to enact laws
"direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals,
whether sanctioned by state legislation or not."2 6
This trio of cases appeared to offer definitive answers regarding
the scope of congressional power under the enforcement clauses. The
surety-role definition of Chief Justice Waite's opinion in United States
v. Cruikshank27 was abandoned in favor of another nineteenth cen-
tury approach formulated by Justice Strong in Ex parte Virginia:28
All of the [Civil War] amendments derive much of their force
from [the enforcement clauses]. It is not said the judicial power
of the general government shall extend to enforcing the prohibi-
tions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. It
is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to
declare void any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions.
It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress
is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legisla-
tion. Some legislation is contemplated to make the amendments
fully effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objects the Amendments have in view, whatever
tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain,
and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of
civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State
denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain
of congressional power.29
Applying the logic of this opinion, the three landmark decisions of
the Warren Court trio held that the enforcement clauses were added
to the self-executing provisions of the amendments so that Congress
could legislate cures for the social and political ills which the amend-
ments were only beginning to remedy. Consequently, any legislation
25 Id. at 440.
26Id. at 438, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 23 (1883).
27 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
28 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
29 Id. at 345-46 (emphasis in original).
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which was rationally related to the purposes of the amendments was
constitutionally legitimate. Furthermore, the Court explicitly noted
that it would not allow Congress to legislate under the guise of the
enforcement clauses to dilute the constitutional guarantees of the
amendments. The clear weight of these precedents, therefore, gave
Congress wide latitude in passing "rational" legislation to enforce the
Civil War amendments.
Oregon v. Mitchell - RETREAT FROM PRECEDENT
In Oregon v. Mitchell,30 the Supreme Court decided four con-
stitutional issues regarding the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970.81 Without the benefit of a majority opinion and in five separate
opinions, the Court per Justice Black announced its judgment: (1) that
the provision lowering the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 was
valid as applied to federal elections; (2) that the provision lowering
the minimum voting age from 21 to 18 was invalid as applied to state
elections inasmuch as section five of the fourteenth amendment did
not authorize Congress to legislate qualifications for state elections;
(3) that the suspension of literacy tests for five years for federal, state,
and local elections was a valid exercise of congressional power under
section five of the fourteenth amendment and section two of the
fifteenth amendment inasmuch as Congress based its determination
on a finding of fact that literacy tests were used to deprive blacks of
the franchise; and (4) that federal legislation governing registration
and absentee voting in presidential elections was constitutional. 2 In
reaching these results, the Court abandoned the precedents of the
1960's and carved out new constitutional requirements for congres-
sional legislation under the enforcement clauses.
The Black Interpretation
Justice Black wrote that the historical context of the Civil War
amendments was of overriding importance and that the enforcement
clauses were chiefly intended to give Congress power to legislate over
racial discrimination:
The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to make
every discrimination between groups of people a constitutional
denial of equal protection. Nor was the Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prohibit every discrimina-
30400 U.S. 112 (1970).
81 Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 1, 84 Stat. 314, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970).
82400 US. at 117-19.
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don between groups of people. On the other hand, the Civil War
Amendments were unquestionably designed to condemn and
forbid every distinction, however triffing, on account of race.83
Given this requirement of racial discrimination, Justice Black held
that the suspension of literacy tests was a valid exercise of power under
the enforcement clauses of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,
but that interference with age requirements in state elections was
unwarranted since section five of the fourteenth amendment was not
intended to cover unequal treatment on account of age: "I would hold
that Congress has exceeded its powers in attempting to lower the
voting age in state and local elections." 84
The Brennan, White, and Marshall Interpretation
In addressing the issue of congressional control over state voting
age qualifications, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall rejected
Justice Black's view that the authority conferred by section five of the
fourteenth amendment was limited to eliminating racial discrimina-
tion. These three Justices believed that, so long as there is a rational
factual basis for the legislative determination that equal protection
of the laws is being denied, then no further judicial inquiry regarding
constitutionality is required.3 5 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's opinion
reiterated the position of Katzenbach v. Morgan that the standard for
determining the appropriateness of legislation under the amendment
was not the same as that used for a judicial determination of state
action in violation of equal protection. Rather, "[t]he question is the
scope of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."86
Within this conceptual framework, the Brennan opinion was able
to conclude that, because Congress based its determination that re-
stricting voters between the ages of 18 and 21 was a denial of equal
protection on sufficient factual data, the federal statute was constitu-
tionally valid as appropriate legislation under the fourteenth amend-
ment:
We believe there is serious question whether a statute granting
the franchise to citizens 21 and over while denying it to those
between the ages of 18 and 21 could, in any event, withstand
present scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless
83 Id. at 127.
34 Id. at 130.
35 Id. at 229, 248-49 (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
86 Id. at 246.
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of the answer to this question, however, it is dear to us that
proper regard for the special function of Congress in making
determinations of legislative fact compels this Court to respect
those determinations unless they are contradicted by evidence
far stronger than anything that has been adduced in these cases.
We would uphold [congressional extension of the vote to 18 year
olds] as a valid exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.S7
The Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun Interpretation
Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, took the position that Congress has no power to
determine voter qualifications in state or federal elections. Justice
Stewart was "convinced that Congress was wholly without constitu-
tional power to alter - for the purpose of any elections - the voting
age requirements now determined by the several states." 38 To vali-
date this premise, the opinion pointed to article I, sections two and
four of the Constitution as wholly and unalterably reserving within
the domain of state sovereignty the right of state legislatures to deter-
mine all qualifications for voting. Given the contradictory policies of
article I, section two, and of the federal statutory reduction of state
voting age requirements, the Stewart opinion quoted Justice Black to
justify the conclusion that statutory interference with state voting pre-
requisites must not endure:
It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that
the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in
every election from President to local constable or village alder-
man. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the
States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elec-
tions, except to the limited extent that the people through con-
stitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of
the States.8 9
The problem posed by the Black-Stewart-Burger-Blackmun view
is how one can consistently advocate that the fourteenth amendment
validly changed the structure of federal-state relations by imposing a
federal constitutional standard of equal protection of the laws on the
state except for the area of state control of elections. Logic suggests
that it is futile to refer back to pre-amendment provisions of article I,
sections two and four to justify absolute state control over voter quali-
37 Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 282 (Stewart, Blackmun, JJ., & Burger, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
30 Id. at 294, quoting Justice Black's opinion, id. at 125.
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fications of all elections and to argue that equal protection of the laws
was not then the mandate of constitutional law. Yet, in essence, that
was the Black-Stewart approach, and their opinions refuse to recognize
the historical fact that the fourteenth amendment also amended
article I. Justice Stewart's statement that Congress has the power to
regulate interstate commerce, but may not, in the exercise of that
power, impinge upon the guarantees of the Bill of Rights is correct. 40
However, his application of the converse of that rule is wholly without
support in logic. Although commerce clause legislation cannot inter-
fere with first amendment rights, first amendment rights obviously
limit congressional power under the commerce clause. For example, if
a federal statute provided for censorship in the interstate delivery of
newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals it would be stricken
down as an exercise of power under the commerce clause which vio-
lated first amendment rights. By analogy, therefore, state legislation
pursuant to article I, section two, which provided that only brown-
eyed brunettes of Anglo-Saxon descent are qualified to vote would
be in contravention of the fourteenth amendment and would be
subject to revision by the judiciary or appropriate federal legislation.
The Harlan Interpretation
Justice Harlan argued that the intent of the framers of the amend-
ments conclusively determined the breadth of congressional power to
pass appropriate legislation. He then demonstrated by reciting the
history of the amendments that the framers never intended the equal
protection clause to provide for equality of voting rights under state
law.41 Given this premise, the judiciary - and Congress - were com-
pletely powerless to strike down an otherwise obvious violation of
equal protection of the laws. Justice Harlan bolstered this argument
by pointing out that state power over voting qualifications was reserved
to the states under article I, and by noting that, in addition to the
fourteenth amendment, the fifteenth amendment was required to en-
franchise blacks:
Small wonder, then, that in early 1869 substantially the same
group of men who three years earlier had proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment felt it necessary to make further modifications in the
Constitution if state suffrage laws were to be controlled even to
the minimal degree of prohibiting qualifications which on their
face discriminated on the basis of race.42
40 Id. at 287.
41 See id. at 152, 200 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
42 Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
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Consequently, under the Harlan view, the domain of state sovereignty
as it pertained to voter qualifications in state and federal elections
remained wholly inviolate, and section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment gave Congress no authority whatsoever to eliminate discrimina-
tion in regard to voting qualifications.
There is, however, a curious twist in the Harlan opinion. In
support of his conclusion Justice Harlan quotes John Marshall's asser-
tion in Marbury v. Madison:43 "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 44 Although
Justice Harlan ostensibly subscribed to this view, the whole thrust of
his opinion was that politicians who are long dead can dictate to the
judiciary the hidden meaning of their words as framed in a constitu-
tional amendment. The ultimate result of referring to their debates
and political speeches was a refusal to give effect to the plain meaning
of the words of the amendment.45 In Justice Harlan's view, therefore,
the fourteenth amendment provided that no state shall deny any
person the equal protection of the laws except in the instance of state
laws setting voting qualifications for state and federal elections wherein
the states can establish as many discriminatory practices as they see fit.
The Douglas Interpretation
In deciding the issue of voting age restrictions in federal and state
elections, Justice Douglas squarely addressed the issue in terms of the
scope of congressional power to affirmatively provide for the equal
protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. In answering
that Congress was vested with the power to give the 18-year-olds the
vote in all elections, Douglas placed himself well within the province
of the judicial precedents of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., and held that
section five was a positive grant enabling Congress to pass appropriate
legislation." In deciding whether or not the legislation was appro-
priate, Justice Douglas reiterated Chief Justice Marshall's "test" in
McCulloch v. Maryland, and argued that "[t]he reach of § 5 to 'enforce'
equal protection by eliminating election inequalities would seem
quite broad."47 Consequently, the power of Congress to give 18-year-
435 U.S. (I Cranch) 157 (1803).
44400 U.S. at 204, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
45 For a classic argument over the weight to be given the framers' original intent,
see Beard, The Supreme Court -Usurper or Grantee? 27 POL. Smx. Q. 1 (1912).
46400 U.S. at 135, 141 (Douglas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
47 Id. at 143.
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olds the vote in federal and state elections through statute was "appro-
priate" to ensure the equal protection of the laws.
Replying to the proposition that article I reserved the power to
set voter qualifications to the states, Justice Douglas stated the obvious:
article I, section two was amended and must be read in light of such
amendments. "[T]he Civil War Amendments - the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth - made vast inroads on the powers of the States.
Equal protection became a standard for state action and Congress was
given authority to 'enforce' it."48
In answer to the view that the equal protection clause was in-
tended to apply only to racial discrimination, Justice Douglas noted
that it was far too late in time to adopt this view given the nonracial
discrimination cases already decided under the authority of the four-
teenth amendment,49 and that the absence of a single word in the
amendment limiting it to racial discrimination alone indicates an
intention to the contrary.
In essence, Justice Douglas argued against the new majority's pre-
vailing view that, somehow, the words of the fourteenth amendment
did not really mean what they said. Instead, this learned jurist argued
for the application of stare decisis to support a literal reading of the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.
CONCLUSION
The scope of congressional power to legislate under the enforce-
ment clauses of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
has undergone dramatic transformation. The 1876 surety-role defini-
tion of United States v. Cruikshank,r° has given way to the expan-
sionary interpretation of the Warren Court. The Warren Court recog-
nized that the amendments themselves were self-executing, and that
the addition of the enforcement clauses indicates that something more
was contemplated than mere duplication by statute of that which was al-
ready accomplished by amendment. Consequently, the Warren Court
posited that the enforcement clauses were an explicit constitutional
authorization for the Congress to enact legislative addenda to fulfill
the constitutional policies of the amendments. As such, however, the
48 Id.
49 In the appendix, 400 U.S. at 150-52, Justice Douglas indicated that the non-
discrimination prescription of the equal protection clause has been applied for the
benefit of aliens, illegitimate children, mothers of illegitimate children, welfare recip-
ients, criminal defendants, milk dealers, railroad companies, foreign corporations, and
others.
Go 92 U.S. 542 (1826); see text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
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Court required the traditional rational relationship test of McCulloch
v. Maryland.51 Thus, enforcement legislation must be able to with-
stand this standard of judicial scrutiny in order to be constitutionally
legitimate.
The Warren Court emphasized that the rational relationship be-
tween the legislative enactment and the constitutional provision is to be
judged from Congress' perspective, and the judiciary must respect that
view. In this manner, the traditional presumption of validity was
granted to legislation under the enforcement clauses as is customary
with all federal and state statutes. Expressed in negative terms, it
meant that the legislative criteria for implementing the policies of
the Civil War amendments through federal statutes was not neces-
sarily the same as judicial standards for striking down as unconstitu-
tional state statutes under the same amendments. Implicit in this
approach, was a recognition that the judicial and legislative functions
are indeed different in character, and even an activist judiciary is not
bestowed with the powers that an activist legislature enjoys for remedy-
ing the social and political ills intended to be abolished by the
amendments.
In espousing this rational relationship test, the Court felt obli-
gated to observe by way of footnote in Katzenbach v. Morgan,52 that
a legislative enactment could be irrational and unreasonable, and
therefore unconstitutional, in not one but rather two distinct manners.
The first type of violation is the classic example of unconstitutionality:
the legislation is unduly broad in scope and therefore not authorized
by the Constitution. By way of illustration, assume Congress, in an
attempt to promote equal protection of the laws, passes a statute
mandating absolute equality of education for all with only one pre-
scribed course of study, thereby establishing an identical minimum-
maximum level of educational attainment. It is not difficult to imagine
that the Supreme Court would strike down such an educational
standard imposed upon the states as exceeding the scope of congres-
sional power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
51 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
52 384 U.S. 641, 651-52 n.1O (1966). The Court noted that
Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guar-
antees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees. ... [A]n enactment authorizing the States to establish
racially segregated systems of education would not be - as required by § 5 - a
measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force
prohibits such state laws.
Id. (emphasis added). See Note, Congressional Power Under Section Five of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 25 SrAN. L. REV. 885, 893-95 (1973).
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The second manner of violating this rational relationship test is
more subtle and, therefore, more difficult to detect. A statute could be
held unconstitutional if it dilutes the guarantees of the amendments
while purporting to enforce their intent. An example would be a
federal statute providing for automatic job priority for American
Indians who apply for jobs with state and local governments. Although
the statute arguably could be an attempt to provide equal protection
of the laws for American Indians by compensating them for former
discrimination, in ultimate effect, it would be a dilution of the right
to equal job opportunity for all nonIndians. As the Court explicitly
noted in Katzenbach v. Morgan, dilutions of the amendment's guar-
antees will not be tolerated even under the guise of enforcing the
amendment.5 3
With the advent of Oregon v. Mitchell, the approach of the
Warren Court was partially abandoned. Justice Black read the enforce-
ment clause of the fourteenth amendment as merely authorizing
congressional legislation to eliminate racial discrimination. Justices
Burger, Blackmun, Stewart, and Harlan joined to argue that article I,
section two preserved absolute state control over age-based voting
qualifications. The common element of their three opinions is that
all insisted upon adding words to the amendment that are not there.
Justice Black read the enforcement clause as authorizing Congress
to pass appropriate legislation to promote equal protection of the
laws only in regard to racial discrimination. Justices Burger, Stewart,
Blackmun, and Harlan read that same section as permitting appro-
priate legislation except with regard to state voting age requirements,
since in their view, the fourteenth amendment did not amend article
I of the Constitution. Under this approach, even federal legislation
which was rationally related to the purpose of the amendment would
not be appropriate because state sovereignty over voter qualifications
supersedes the fourteenth amendment. 4 While the Warren Court's
expansionary interpretation of the enforcement clauses still stands
except for federal legislation affecting state voting age qualifications,
one must wonder whether the Court may someday apply other con-
53 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
54 The discussion in Oregon v. Mitchell of congressional authority to regulate state
voting age requirements became academic with the passage of the twenty-sixth amend-
ment:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
U.S. CONs. amend. XXVI.
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stitutional provisions regarding state activities in derogation of the
mandate of the fourteenth amendment.55
The crucial fact of history is that the enforcement clauses of the
Civil War amendments remain an untapped repository of constitu-
tional authorization for federal legislation to promote equal protec-
tion of the laws. In an era when various and sundry interest groups are
pressing for constitutional amendments as the vehicle for imple-
menting their social and cultural objectives, the fact that the constitu-
tional mechanism is already there for implementing such objectives
through legislation escapes notice.
"Abortion on demand" has become the practical reality in light
of Roe v. Wade5 and Doe v. Bolton.57 One may speculate what would
be the response to federal legislation extending equal protection of the
law to all human life, including fetal life, and proscribing the usage
of state funds and state-related medical institutions in assisting indi-
viduals in the termination of fetal life. Would the Supreme Court
view such a statute as outside the scope of congressional authority
under the enforcement clause in that the equal protection guarantee
extends only to "persons" and it is the province of the judiciary to
determine who falls within that term? Or would the Court adopt
Justice Black's premise that the enforcement clause could not over-
rule another guarantee of the Constitution, namely, the right to privacy
as espoused in Wade and Bolton, and thus strike down the legislation
as unjustifiably interfering with the exercise of another constitutional
right?
The pending equal rights amendment proposes the elimination
55 In Oregon v. Mitchell, five Justices held that the requirements of article I, § 2,
providing for election of members of the House of Representatives by the residents of each
state, preempted congressional authority to remedy perceived denials of equal protection
through § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.. This possibly could be the pattern that the
Burger Court will follow, ie., using one section of the Constitution to nullify another
without attempting to interpret such sections as consistent with each other. Similarly, in
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1972), rehearing denied, 410 U.S. 948 (1973),
Justice Rehnquist argued that the twenty-first amendment preempted the first amendment
in some respects:
While we agree that at least some of the performances [sexually live entertainment
and fIlms] to which these regulations address themselves are within the limits of
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, the critical fact is that
California has not forbidden these performances across the board. It has merely
proscribed such performances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by
the drink.
Given the added presumption in favor of the validity of the state regu-
lation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment requires, we cannot hold
that the regulations on their face violate the Federal Constitution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
56410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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of sexual discrimination.58 Yet by virtue of the enforcement clause of
the fourteenth amendment, the constitutional authorization exists for
federal legislation advancing equal protection of the laws with regard
to sex. Legislation rather than amendment or judicial construction
would produce significant advantages. 59 First, in resolving one set of
problems, Congress would not be bound by stare decisis to resolve the
next set in the same manner. Second, differentiations based on sex
could be eliminated on a selective basis, distinguishing the good from
the bad.60 Third, legislation can reconcile competing values, such as
the right of privacy and the elimination of sex differentiation. 1 Finally,
legislation is more quickly and easily implemented than amendment.
Given the period of benign neglect which followed the civil rights
movement of the 1960's, equal protection of the laws regardless of
race remains an unattained goal. Moreover, the objective of economic
equality among races is far from fulfilled. Yet there is no hue and cry
for enlightened congressional legislation which has as its purpose the
elimination of economic disparity among the races. Assume that con-
gressional investigation resulted in a finding of fact that the total
impact of state legislation perpetuates economic inequality among the
races, primarily to the detriment of blacks. Assume further that Con-
gress provided for special funding for black scholarships and black
business ventures in order to promote economic equal protection of
the laws. Would the Supreme Court view such a statutory scheme out-
side the scope of congressional authority under the enforcement clause?
Or would the Court hold that such a statute diluted the existing pro-
tections in that blacks would be singled out for receipt of government
benefits to the exclusion of other racial or minority groups?
58 The proposed Equal Rights Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972),
passed by the Senate on March 22, 1972, 118 CONG. Rie. 9598 (1972), and submitted to
the states for ratification, provides:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
59 But see Karabian, The Equal Rights Amendment: Contribution of Our Genera-
tion of Americans, 1 PEPPERD E L. Rxv. 327 (1974). "[SNex discrimination, like race dis-
crimination, can be dealt with effectively only through a broad and permanent national
commitment, a Constitutional amendment." Id. at 349 (footnotes omitted). For more
extended comparisons of sex and race discrimination, see Johnston & Knapp, Sex Dis-
crimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. R v. 675, 738-41
(1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARv. L. R-v. 1499, 1507-09 (1971).
60 See Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitu-




Recognition of congressional authority to promote equal protec-
tion in racial matters has come from unlikely quarters. On March 17,
1972, President Nixon, responding to the sanctioning of busing by the
courts, made the following proposal:
The 14th Amendment to the Constitution... provides that "The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article."
Until now, enforcement has been left largely to the courts-
which have operated within a limited range of available reme-
dies .... I propose that the Congress now accept the responsibility
and use the authority given to it under the 14th Amendment to
clear up the confusion which contradictory court orders have
created .... 02
The only resulting enactments were amendments to the Higher Educa-
tion Act63 providing for temporary restraint of busing ordered "for the
purposes of achieving a balance among students with respect to race,
sex, religion, or socioeconomic status .... 4
Is Congress able to abolish capital punishment via the due pro-
cess or equal protection clauses as some commentators have sug-
gested?6 Could Congress require twelve-man juries in all cases if it is
factually determined that they are necessary to insure due process in
state courts? Certainly the Supreme Court has not hesitated to hedge
the authority of the states through judicial construction of the four-
teenth amendment.
There are presently no definitive answers to the hypotheses posed
above. Oregon v. Mitchell signalled a partial halt to the Warren
Court's view that "rational is appropriate." Future interpretations of
the enforcement clauses remain to be rendered. History has once again
set the stage for a transformation of the amendments. Justices Harlan
and Black, whose opinions were decisive in carving out limited excep-
tions to the Warren Court's expansionary view of the enforcement
clauses, have been replaced by Justices Powell" and Rehnquist. 7 If one
02 118 CoNG. REc. 8929 (1972).
63 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 801-06, 86 Stat. 371 (June
23, 1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (Supp. 1973)).
04 Id. § 803.
65 See, e.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARv. L. Rnv. 1773, 1814 (1970).
06 Justice Powell has been compared to Justice Harlan in terms of his concern with
balancing conflicting interests. Gunther, The Supreme Court: 1971 Term, Foreword -
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. RaEV. 1, 7 (1972).
67 An assistant attorney general at the time Congress debated lowering the voting
age, Justice Rehnquist argued against reliance on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
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of the two should read the clauses in conformity with Ex parte Vir-
ginia,68 the Warren Court's interpretation of the enforcement clauses
would once again stand as the law of the land. If both should join
Burger, Blackmun, and Stewart, the final definitions of the enforcement
clauses could take a variety of twists and turns with ad hoc exceptions
carved into the amendments under a new banner of states' rights: all
which has been taken away can yet be retained. Prophecy, however, is
for the sages, and pronouncements on the law of the land are for the
Supreme Court. 9 The question of the scope of congressional power
under the enforcement clauses remains as open today as it was in 1875
when Senator Boutwell observed:
The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments did limit
the power of States; they did extend the power of the General
Government; and the question we are considering almost con-
tinually is the extent to which the power of the States has been
limited by these amendments and the extent to which the power
of the General Government has been carried by these several
amendments.70
Until Congress attemnpts to use the power given in the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War amendments to meet the social and political
challenges posed by such issues as abortion, sex discrimination, and
racial discrimination, the question of the scope of that power will
remain unanswered.
(1966), to accomplish this end. Instead, he advocated the use of a constitutional amend-
ment. 116 CONG. Rxc. 6965-66 (1970).
68 100 U.S. 339 (1880); see text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
69 One commentator has "prophesied" a cautious approach by Congress in the
future:
The uncertainty generated by Oregon v. Mitchell will, in all likelihood, cause
Congress to shy away from justifying legislation expanding civil rights solely on
the basis of congressional power to interpret the 14th amendment. With refer-
ence to future racial civil rights legislation, congressional power under the 13th
and 15th amendments will obviate any necessity for reliance on section 5 of
the 14th amendment. Beyond racial discrimination, alternative sources of con-
gressional power- such as the commerce clause - will almost surely be invoked.
Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L.
Ray. 603, 620 (1975).
703 CONG. Rac. 1792 (1875).
